Wednesday, November 25, 2020

the mentors of the brothers Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly at the helm

Mentors for the Kouachi brothers and Coulibaly, Farid Benyettou, a former preacher who claims to repent, and Djamel Beghal, a veteran of the jihad, are called to testify on Thursday at the January 2015 trial, which is also presented as close to the Kouachi brothers, Peter Cherif is also heard at the video conference.

Following a three-day hearing on the hostage-taking of Hyper Kosher on January 9, 2015, the Special Assize Court in Paris is interested from Thursday, September 24 in the profile and motivation of the three perpetrators of the attacks: the Kouachi brothers, who had attacked Charlie Hebdo and Amédy Coulibaly, for the victims of Montrouge and the kosher store.

During a series of long-awaited hearings, three of their former mentors are called: Peter Chérif, imprisoned and accused in an inseparable part of the case, who must be heard by video conference, Farid Benyettou, who presents himself as a penitent, and Djamel Beghal, a veteran of Afghan jihad. The last two are free, but only the first will come to the bar.

The Shadow of Peter Chérif

Presented in turn as a mentor to brothers Chérif and Saïd Kouachi, the instigator of the attack on Charlie Hebdo, an Al-Qaeda executive or even a jihadist, Peter Chérif remains a shadow hovering over this issue.

Arrested in 2018 in Djibouti with his wife and their two children, Peter Chérif will be heard from prison where he is being held pending his trial for criminal conspiracy. This man has often had problems with the law.

Peter Chérif was born in Paris in 1982 and tried to join the army in 2002, following in his grandfather’s footsteps. Wounded, he abandoned the desire for a military life and converted to Islam in 2003. Like the Kouachi brothers, he was seduced by the words of Farid Benyettou, a charismatic mentor, now remorseful, by the so-called “des Buttes Chaumont” sector. That’s where he met the future Charlie Hebdo killers.

Via this delivery channel to the jihad zones, Peter Chérif flies to the Middle East. Damascus for a few months, then Iraq, where he spent several weeks on the front lines at the Battle of Fallujah, in November 2004.

Wounded during the fighting, he eventually surrendered to the Americans. Convicted of Iraqi justice, he spent a few years in some of the most notorious prisons of the time: Abu Ghraïb, then Badoush. From the latter, he fled in 2007, as several dozen members of al-Qaeda were imprisoned with him.

Peter Chérif then decides to leave Iraq. He returned to neighboring Syria, where he surrendered to the French authorities. He arrived in Paris, he is immediately accused, in an uneven part of the investigation of the Buttes Chaumont industry. In March 2011, he was sentenced to five years in prison for criminal conspiracy. But escapes from France before being imprisoned.

In the middle of the Arab Spring, he went to Tunisia, his mother’s country of origin. But it is against Libya that he first looks before he finally chooses Yemen, Al-Qaeda’s country on the Arabian Peninsula (Aqpa). Leaders of the organization, which will claim the attack on Charlie Hebdo, contact him, he explains to French justice.

He, who speaks Arabic, can he serve as a translator for the French who came to join the ranks of jihad, like Chérif Kouachi, who is suspected of having visited Yemen in 2011? Peter Chérif claims that he has only met Kouachi once, nothing more. Prolix about the daily life in Yemen, between several moves, various research work on drones for handling Aqpa, he is evasive, if not silent about something that can directly or indirectly link him to crimes committed in France.

A silence and gray areas during his passage in Yemen that leaves more than doubt about a possible participation in the attacks in January 2015. He has also been charged in a separate section of this investigation since the summer. 2019.

Farid Benyettou, Buttes-Chaumont Industry

Around 2003-2004, Chérif Kouachi began associating with radical Islamists, most notably Farid Benyettou, a self-proclaimed emir of a small, cohesive group of young people in their twenties who live, pray and train together in Paris’ 19th arrondissement. .

Benyettou divorced from childhood for his religious proselytism since childhood for political Islam in his family. When he dropped out of school, he moved away from his family and then moved closer to the rigorist Salafists, saying he had found “a meaning in his life” there. He adopts the traditional long shirt, beard, red and white keffiyeh.

Maintenance agent by day, preacher by night, he gets closer to the former Algerian Armed Forces (GIA) near Al-Qaeda. His small group cultivates hatred of the West and organizes the sending of jihadists to Iraq. This sector of the Buttes-Chaumontest was dismantled in 2005. Farid Benyettou faces six years in prison and Chérif Kouachi, arrested just before leaving for Iraq, for three years.

Benyettou was released from prison in 2009. He has said he has since converted to jihadism, especially since the assassination of Mohammed Merah in early 2012. He continues to see Chérif Kouachi, whom he describes as “his brother”, until 2014. He will say that he has tried in vain to divert him from radical ideas. Shortly after the attacks in January 2015, Benyettou, then in nursing education, introduced himself to the intelligence services and said he was ready to help with the investigation. He blames his guilt and thinks he has “part of the responsibility” by “preaching hatred”, while emphasizing that he “paid (his) debt to society” in prison.

Farid Benyettou will not ultimately be a nurse: the Order’s council is against it given his criminal record. He then worked with anthropologist Dounia Bouzar to prevent radicalization. In early January 2017, he published a book about his career “My Jihad: A Plan of Repentance” and shocked relatives of the victims of the attacks by wearing the badge “Je suis Charlie” during a television program.

Djamel Beghal, the veteran, was met in prison

During his detention in Fleury-Mérogis, in the suburbs of Paris, following his conviction in 2005, Chérif Kouachi met Amedy Coulibaly, imprisoned for theft. But also Djamel Beghal, a veteran of international jihadism.

Age around 40, Beghal spent the first 21 years of his life in Algeria before moving to France. He came to the authorities’ sights in the 1990s for his proximity to the GIA. He travels a lot, in Europe but also in Pakistan and Afghanistan, rocking international jihadism.

In 2001, he was arrested in the United Arab Emirates. He admits, before withdrawing and declaring that he was being tortured by Emirati investigators, after receiving a mandate from Al Qaeda to prepare for attacks in France. Exiled to France, he was sentenced in 2005 to ten years in prison.

In Fleury-Mérogis, Chérif Kouachi, Amedy Coulibaly and other young prisoners are impressed by the CV and “religious studies” of their elders, who become their mentor according to investigators.

Beghal was released in 2009 and is under house arrest in Cantal, where Coulibaly will meet him several times in 2010. The two men will be arrested that year for participating in an escape project by Smaïn Aït Ali Belkacem, a previously convicted GIA. life sentence for the attack at the RER station Musée d’Orsay in October 1995 in Paris. Djamel Beghal receives a second sentence of ten years in prison and is deprived of French nationality.

In July 2018, at the age of 52, at the end of his sentence in France, he was deported to Algeria, where he was sentenced in his absence in 2003 to 20 years in prison for “belonging to a terrorist group”. He was detained there and then tried again and acquitted in December 2019, according to his lawyer Farouk Ksentini.

Beghal is being delivered in the wake of his own accord and is now normally living in Algeria pending his appeal and will “not be able to testify” on Thursday in Paris, Ms Ksentini said, specifying “nothing will happen”.

With AFP

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Somalia must learn to stand alone | By Hassan Sheikh Mohamud

In March 1977, Ethiopia and Somalia edged toward war over the region of Ogaden, which both claimed. Cuba’s revolutionary President Fidel Castro made a desperate dash to the Horn of Africa with a bold plan to keep the peace: with the backing of the Soviet Union, he proposed to combine Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and the soon-to-be-independent French Territory of the Afars and the Issas (now Djibouti) into a Marxist-Leninist superstate that would control the Red Sea and the all-important entrance to the Suez Canal. Not only would the merger resolve the long-standing rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia, it would unleash the region’s economic potential. Even more important to the Kremlin, it would consolidate recent communist gains and make the Soviets the dominant external power in the Horn of Africa. Castro’s shuttle diplomacy failed to win support from regional leaders, most notably Somali military leader Siad Barre, and soon Somalia and Ethiopia were locked in a vicious war. Yet the idea of an integrated Horn of Africa never died. More than four decades after the Ogaden War, the goal of greater political and economic integration lives on—particularly in Ethiopia, the regional hegemon, which is landlocked and depends on its neighbors for access to the sea. Regional organizations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development have also sought to foster integration, as has the United States, which sees deeper trade ties and political cooperation as bulwarks against instability and extremism. Since he came to power in 2018, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has accelerated the regional integration project. He has forged closer ties with Somalia and with Ethiopia’s erstwhile archenemy Eritrea, even signing a tripartite agreement with the leaders of both countries that established a framework for political, economic, and security cooperation. More ominous, Abiy has publicly suggested that economic integration could be a prelude to political integration and ultimately to a single unified government and military in the Horn of Africa. Efforts at political integration that come at the expense of sovereignty are bound to provoke conflict and end in failure. But even economic integration efforts that should in times of peace and stability benefit all parties could backfire under the current conditions. In theory, the free movement of people and goods between Ethiopia and Somalia should ease historical tensions, strengthen economic ties, and foster shared growth and prosperity. But in practice, allowing such movement could deepen the mutual suspicion and chronic insecurity that have crippled Somalia’s democratic development. Simply put, neither Ethiopia nor Somalia is ready for deeper integration. Ethiopia is sliding toward instability and preoccupied with both internal ethnic conflicts and border disputes with Somalia and Eritrea. Somalia, for its part, is too politically fragmented, fragile, and imperiled by extremists to benefit much from regional integration right now. And because Somalia’s current leaders have embraced Ethiopia’s integration agenda without much input from civil society or the public, further implementing that agenda could deepen divisions rather than heal them. Before seeking greater interdependence with its neighbors, therefore, Somalia’s government should focus on turning the tide against the extremist insurgent group al Shabab, strengthening weak and divided governance structures at home, and building on the democratic gains that have been made over the last 20 years. SQUANDERED PROGRESS Somalia has been chronically unstable for nearly 30 years. Its civil war began in 1991, when Barre’s authoritarian regime collapsed and gave way to clan conflicts that ultimately created large swaths of ungoverned territory. This territory proved to be the perfect breeding ground for terrorists, many of whom had trained abroad in Afghanistan and other countries, who eventually established al Shabab, al Qaeda’s most dangerous franchise in Africa. By the time I was sworn in as president in September 2012, al Shabab controlled large portions of Somalia’s major cities. But with the support of the United States, my government was able to arm and train the Somali security forces to more effectively participate in the fight against al Shabab alongside African Union peacekeepers. Together, we created a special forces battalion modeled after the U.S. Army Rangers. Called the “Danab,” or Lightning Brigade, it pursued al Shabab behind enemy lines, disrupted terror plots, and eliminated important terrorists from the battlefield. But the military pressure has eased off of al Shabab in recent years. The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has ramped up airstrikes in Somalia, and more U.S. military personnel are now stationed in Somalia than in any African country aside from Djibouti and Niger. In the final weeks of his administration, however, Trump is reportedly considering withdrawing nearly all of these troops. Moreover, the Somali government and its African Union military partners have slowed the pace of their operations against al Shabab and even lost control of strategic areas such as the Shabelle Valley and towns along the border with Ethiopia. At the same time, al Shabab has carried out hundreds of attacks in Somalia and in neighboring countries. In January 2020, for instance, the group attacked the Manda Bay Airfield in the coastal Kenyan town of Lamu, killing several Kenyan and American troops. Al Shabab continues to administer a parallel system of government in parts of Mogadishu, the capital, and in southern Somalia, including along stretches of the borders with Kenya and Ethiopia. Before Somalia can begin to think about deepening ties with neighbors and allowing freer movement across its borders, it will need to consolidate control over those borders and over other regions currently controlled by al Shabab. To that end, the Somali government and its African Union partners will need to go back on the offensive against the terrorist group—not just to liberate al Shabab–controlled areas but to hold them permanently so the government can win back hearts and minds. Governance at both state and federal levels will also need to improve before regional integration can proceed. During my presidency, Somalia began a complicated federation process through which four regional states were formed. Much progress was made initially toward state building and toward reconciliation of clan and regional conflicts. But soon after coming to power in 2017, the current administration of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed dissolved the leadership of the nascent federal states and installed its allies in their place, weakening the federalization process and triggering conflict with the regional governments. In the absence of a strong working relationship with regional governments, the federal government has often relied on Ethiopian troops operating outside of the African Union chain of command to advance its political interests in the regional states. In December 2018, for instance, it ordered Ethiopian troops to arrest a former al Shabab spokesman who was running for parliament in the newly formed South West regional state. The arrest sparked days of protests in South West state, to which federal security forces later responded with a violent crackdown. Such transgressions only deepen the Somali public’s suspicion of and antipathy toward Ethiopia, making future aboveboard cooperation more difficult. In addition to improving governance, Somalia must strengthen its democratic institutions before it seeks closer ties with its neighbors. One reason the current government’s embrace of regional integration efforts has proved so contentious is that ordinary Somalis have had very little say in the matter. While previous governments have often consulted closely with parliament and the regional states on important national issues, the current government has upended that political tradition by making decisions unilaterally. To begin to repair and eventually fortify its democratic institutions, the federal government will need to restore this consultative tradition. LINKED FATES, SHARED FUTURES Taken together, Somalia’s problems with security and governance do not augur well for regional integration. But with progress against al Shabab, on governance, and toward democracy, the country might be able to reap the rewards of deeper trade and economic ties with its neighbors in the future. Somalia’s international partners, particularly those from outside the immediate region, can help move Somalia in that direction. During my presidency, the United States supported Somalia’s government not just militarily but with state building, reconciliation, and democratic governance. Regrettably, during the past three and a half years, the focus of the two countries’ relationship has shifted from a partnership centered on democratization and state building to one centered almost exclusively on security cooperation. As a result, the United States has ignored serious violations of human rights and democratic norms in Mogadishu—including harassment of opposition figures and a vicious war against Somalia’s free press. These violations have caused relations between the federal government and some of the federal member states to break down, impeding security cooperation and allowing al Shabab to regroup and even expand its reach. The United States should think twice before withdrawing its troops from Somalia, which would only embolden the terrorist group. But it should also revive the vital nonsecurity aspects of its relationship with Somalia, without which the country’s democracy will continue to atrophy. The fates of Somalis and Americans are interlinked, as evidenced by the thriving Somali diaspora in the United States. As a result, Washington has a vested interest in supporting the long-term stability of Somalia and of the greater Horn of Africa region. That stability cannot be achieved without security, democracy, and the rule of law—precisely the preconditions that are necessary to transform the regional integration project from a dream into a reality. HASSAN SHEIKH MOHAMUD served as President of Somalia from 2012 to 2017. Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Caasimada Online. For publication please email your article [email protected] Thank You

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Somalia must learn to stand alone | By Hassan Sheikh Mohamud

In March 1977, Ethiopia and Somalia edged toward war over the region of Ogaden, which both claimed. Cuba’s revolutionary President Fidel Castro made a desperate dash to the Horn of Africa with a bold plan to keep the peace: with the backing of the Soviet Union, he proposed to combine Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and the soon-to-be-independent French Territory of the Afars and the Issas (now Djibouti) into a Marxist-Leninist superstate that would control the Red Sea and the all-important entrance to the Suez Canal. Not only would the merger resolve the long-standing rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia, it would unleash the region’s economic potential. Even more important to the Kremlin, it would consolidate recent communist gains and make the Soviets the dominant external power in the Horn of Africa. Castro’s shuttle diplomacy failed to win support from regional leaders, most notably Somali military leader Siad Barre, and soon Somalia and Ethiopia were locked in a vicious war. Yet the idea of an integrated Horn of Africa never died. More than four decades after the Ogaden War, the goal of greater political and economic integration lives on—particularly in Ethiopia, the regional hegemon, which is landlocked and depends on its neighbors for access to the sea. Regional organizations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development have also sought to foster integration, as has the United States, which sees deeper trade ties and political cooperation as bulwarks against instability and extremism. Since he came to power in 2018, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has accelerated the regional integration project. He has forged closer ties with Somalia and with Ethiopia’s erstwhile archenemy Eritrea, even signing a tripartite agreement with the leaders of both countries that established a framework for political, economic, and security cooperation. More ominous, Abiy has publicly suggested that economic integration could be a prelude to political integration and ultimately to a single unified government and military in the Horn of Africa. Efforts at political integration that come at the expense of sovereignty are bound to provoke conflict and end in failure. But even economic integration efforts that should in times of peace and stability benefit all parties could backfire under the current conditions. In theory, the free movement of people and goods between Ethiopia and Somalia should ease historical tensions, strengthen economic ties, and foster shared growth and prosperity. But in practice, allowing such movement could deepen the mutual suspicion and chronic insecurity that have crippled Somalia’s democratic development. Simply put, neither Ethiopia nor Somalia is ready for deeper integration. Ethiopia is sliding toward instability and preoccupied with both internal ethnic conflicts and border disputes with Somalia and Eritrea. Somalia, for its part, is too politically fragmented, fragile, and imperiled by extremists to benefit much from regional integration right now. And because Somalia’s current leaders have embraced Ethiopia’s integration agenda without much input from civil society or the public, further implementing that agenda could deepen divisions rather than heal them. Before seeking greater interdependence with its neighbors, therefore, Somalia’s government should focus on turning the tide against the extremist insurgent group al Shabab, strengthening weak and divided governance structures at home, and building on the democratic gains that have been made over the last 20 years. SQUANDERED PROGRESS Somalia has been chronically unstable for nearly 30 years. Its civil war began in 1991, when Barre’s authoritarian regime collapsed and gave way to clan conflicts that ultimately created large swaths of ungoverned territory. This territory proved to be the perfect breeding ground for terrorists, many of whom had trained abroad in Afghanistan and other countries, who eventually established al Shabab, al Qaeda’s most dangerous franchise in Africa. By the time I was sworn in as president in September 2012, al Shabab controlled large portions of Somalia’s major cities. But with the support of the United States, my government was able to arm and train the Somali security forces to more effectively participate in the fight against al Shabab alongside African Union peacekeepers. Together, we created a special forces battalion modeled after the U.S. Army Rangers. Called the “Danab,” or Lightning Brigade, it pursued al Shabab behind enemy lines, disrupted terror plots, and eliminated important terrorists from the battlefield. But the military pressure has eased off of al Shabab in recent years. The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has ramped up airstrikes in Somalia, and more U.S. military personnel are now stationed in Somalia than in any African country aside from Djibouti and Niger. In the final weeks of his administration, however, Trump is reportedly considering withdrawing nearly all of these troops. Moreover, the Somali government and its African Union military partners have slowed the pace of their operations against al Shabab and even lost control of strategic areas such as the Shabelle Valley and towns along the border with Ethiopia. At the same time, al Shabab has carried out hundreds of attacks in Somalia and in neighboring countries. In January 2020, for instance, the group attacked the Manda Bay Airfield in the coastal Kenyan town of Lamu, killing several Kenyan and American troops. Al Shabab continues to administer a parallel system of government in parts of Mogadishu, the capital, and in southern Somalia, including along stretches of the borders with Kenya and Ethiopia. Before Somalia can begin to think about deepening ties with neighbors and allowing freer movement across its borders, it will need to consolidate control over those borders and over other regions currently controlled by al Shabab. To that end, the Somali government and its African Union partners will need to go back on the offensive against the terrorist group—not just to liberate al Shabab–controlled areas but to hold them permanently so the government can win back hearts and minds. Governance at both state and federal levels will also need to improve before regional integration can proceed. During my presidency, Somalia began a complicated federation process through which four regional states were formed. Much progress was made initially toward state building and toward reconciliation of clan and regional conflicts. But soon after coming to power in 2017, the current administration of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed dissolved the leadership of the nascent federal states and installed its allies in their place, weakening the federalization process and triggering conflict with the regional governments. In the absence of a strong working relationship with regional governments, the federal government has often relied on Ethiopian troops operating outside of the African Union chain of command to advance its political interests in the regional states. In December 2018, for instance, it ordered Ethiopian troops to arrest a former al Shabab spokesman who was running for parliament in the newly formed South West regional state. The arrest sparked days of protests in South West state, to which federal security forces later responded with a violent crackdown. Such transgressions only deepen the Somali public’s suspicion of and antipathy toward Ethiopia, making future aboveboard cooperation more difficult. In addition to improving governance, Somalia must strengthen its democratic institutions before it seeks closer ties with its neighbors. One reason the current government’s embrace of regional integration efforts has proved so contentious is that ordinary Somalis have had very little say in the matter. While previous governments have often consulted closely with parliament and the regional states on important national issues, the current government has upended that political tradition by making decisions unilaterally. To begin to repair and eventually fortify its democratic institutions, the federal government will need to restore this consultative tradition. LINKED FATES, SHARED FUTURES Taken together, Somalia’s problems with security and governance do not augur well for regional integration. But with progress against al Shabab, on governance, and toward democracy, the country might be able to reap the rewards of deeper trade and economic ties with its neighbors in the future. Somalia’s international partners, particularly those from outside the immediate region, can help move Somalia in that direction. During my presidency, the United States supported Somalia’s government not just militarily but with state building, reconciliation, and democratic governance. Regrettably, during the past three and a half years, the focus of the two countries’ relationship has shifted from a partnership centered on democratization and state building to one centered almost exclusively on security cooperation. As a result, the United States has ignored serious violations of human rights and democratic norms in Mogadishu—including harassment of opposition figures and a vicious war against Somalia’s free press. These violations have caused relations between the federal government and some of the federal member states to break down, impeding security cooperation and allowing al Shabab to regroup and even expand its reach. The United States should think twice before withdrawing its troops from Somalia, which would only embolden the terrorist group. But it should also revive the vital nonsecurity aspects of its relationship with Somalia, without which the country’s democracy will continue to atrophy. The fates of Somalis and Americans are interlinked, as evidenced by the thriving Somali diaspora in the United States. As a result, Washington has a vested interest in supporting the long-term stability of Somalia and of the greater Horn of Africa region. That stability cannot be achieved without security, democracy, and the rule of law—precisely the preconditions that are necessary to transform the regional integration project from a dream into a reality. HASSAN SHEIKH MOHAMUD served as President of Somalia from 2012 to 2017. Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Caasimada Online. For publication please email your article [email protected] Thank You

Cristiano Ronaldo Oo Ka Fal Celiyay Goolkii Uu Bruno FernandsKa Dhaliyay Istanbul Basaksehir

Cristiano Ronaldo ayaa sida muuqata taageero u ah Bruno Fernands Isaga oo “Like” saaray goolkii uu ka dhaliyay kooxda Istanbul Basaksehir kulankii champions League. Xiddiga...

Dagaalka gobolka Tigray: Dad kor u dhaafaya 600 oo hal goob lagu xasuuqay

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Hay’adda FAO oo sheegtay inay yaraatay xawaaraha duufaanta GATI

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